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· ·Introduction 
Recently there is a well-intentioned concern, on the part of the 
1) . . 2) · 
academicians and practioners alike , that in the development process 
of a contemporary 1ess developed countries, there may be a conflict 
between growth and FID-equity {i.e. family income distribution equity). 
A "conflict thesis" is, of course, not new. For historically, when 
the Western countries (e.g. England) went into the ''modern growth 
· 4)· 3)
epoch" , radical writers of the 19th century (e.g. Karl Marx) had 
already made a similar but more vehement protest against the unequal 
accumulation of capital wealth to the extent that families are stratified 
into a capital-owning (bourgeois) class CH and a capital-less 
, L 
~ 
(proletarian) class C. This "class orientation" stresses an extreme 
and stylized form of inequality of capital ownership. This paper aims 
to approach the "conflict thesis"-- i.e. growth with or without equity 
analytically. • I 
Any analytical framework of a "conflict thesis" will have to 
incoporate "macro" as well as "micro" economic variables. For "macro" 
variables, the' '"class-orientation" necessitates the postulation of 
labor (1) and capital (k) that receives, respectively, wage income (w) 
and property income {ir=rk) where r is the '"rate of r.A.t11rn to capital". 
The national income z, with two values added components, (i.e. z-=w+rk) 
in turn leads to savings (s) and consumption (c) (i.e. z=c+s). In a 
dynamic context, s leads to a larger capital stock k' in the next 
period {k'=s+k) the rapidity of accumulation is described by the rate of 
growth of capital (nk=s/k). Any respectable "conflict thesis" almost 
certainly will have to deal with these macro variables. 
. ·····
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When there are n families, every one of the macro variables x 
introduced above {in a lower case letter), can be disaggregated into 
·,
a pattern{i.e. a vector, indicated by a corresponding upper case letter) 
X=(Xl'x2, ••• Xn) in the sen
se that x-x1+x2+ •••Xn. 
Thus Z=W+-rK = s+c 
and K'=K+S. In particular K=(K1,K2' •••Kn) (K'=
(Ki ,Ki, .. .K~)) is the 
capital-ownership pattern of this{the next) period while S==(s1,s2, •• Sn) 
is the family saving pattern. If I(•) is an index of inequality (e.g. 
-a Gini coefficient), the inequality of family saving I{S) seems to be 
a root cause of the difference between I{K) and I(K') (i.e. the changes 
of the inequality of capital ownership through time). The conflict 
thesis in this paper involves the "macro" capital gro~th rate 'lk as 
well as the inequalities of the patterns of the micro variables. 
The above suggests a number of models of inequality analysis. 
For example, the so called "factor component approach'' to FID analysis
5) 
is.based on Z=W+rK where the wage income pattern W=(W1,w2 , ••••Wn) 
and the property income pattern 1Frk={rK1,rKi,···rKn
) are two factor 
co~onents of the FID pattern Z={Z1,z2, ••• ,Zn). It is well known
6) 
that I(rK)=I(K) (i.e. the inequality of the property income ~=rK or 
the capital ownership pattern K) is more unequally distributed than Z.. and 
hence constitute a primary cause of the inequality of Z (i.e. I(K)>I(Z)). 
Similarly, based on Z=S+c, we shall show that the family saving pattern 
is usually more unequally distributed than Z (i.e. I(S)>I(Z)). Thus, 
in any year, unequal capital ownership is the "cause" of FID inequality 
while an unequally distributed saving pattern Sis the consequence. 
However, a very unequally distributed savings pattern Swill in 
turn worsen the capital ownership pattern (I(K')>I(K)) over time leading 
to an "inequitable orientation". We shall prove that this will occur 
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when families in the capital owning class C
H have a higher "capital-
aensitive7) average propensity to save" than families in CL. Further­
aore, the "inequitable orientation" occurs at a pace proportional to 
the capital growth rate{'\_) for the whole economy., Thus the more 
rapidly the economy grows (i.e. large flit) the faster the "equality of 
capital ownership" deteriorates which, in essence, quantifies the 
"confliet thesis". 
Conscientiousness of growth with wealth concentration has led to 
policy recommendations that includes revolution, fulfillment of basic needs~) 
and progressive income tax system. Let Z=(Z ,z2 , •••Zn) (X=(X1,x2 , ••Xn))1 
be the income pattern for n-families before (after) tax that are related 
by an income tax· schedule t(z) (i.e. x1=z1-t(Z1)). We shall show
 that 
a model of income tax has precisely the same abstract (mathematical) 
properties of the other models (i.e. models based on Z=W+rK=S+c) mentioned 
earlier. Thus a theorem which we shall prove for the income tax model 
(i.e. one that characterizes the progressive income tax system) can be 
used for the.analysis of the "conflict thesis". 
The difficulty of "inequa•lity analysis" is largely due to the 
complexities in the manipulations of "degrees of inequalities". In 
section 1, we shall build the tools of analysis by introducing the 
abstract notion of a "conjugate pairs of transformation functions". 
Properties of these transformation functions will be defined in section 
2 where "abstract" theorems will be proved. These theorems will be 
applied to the income tax problem and the other growth related problems 
in sections 3 and 4. The "conflict thesis" will be presented in the 
final sect ion. 
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Section 1 Inequality Under Transformation 
Let R be the n-dimentional real space R={ZIZ=(Z1,z2 , ••• Zn)L A point 
ZfR is, abstractly, an economic pattern (e.g. a FID pattern) of n families. 
Let T(Z) be a mapping of R into R. Suppose a real valued function t(z) 
is given we can construct a special type of mapping (i.e. an "indexable" 
mapping), according to the following definition: 
Definition: A mapping T(Z) of R into R is indexable by the transformation 
function t(z) if for any z,R, X=(X ,x2 , •••Xn)=T(Z)={t(Z ),1 1 
t(Z2), ••• t(Zn)). 
Let/1 be the set of all indexable mappings and let ::;- be the set of 
all real-valued functions t(z). There is a one to one correspondence 
between x and 'f. We shall use a lower case letter (e.g. w(z)) to denote 
a member off and an upper case letter (e.g. W(Z)) to denote the correspond­
ing mapping. We have the following definition: 
Definition: The conjugate mapping of any T(Z)~)'\ is T*(Z) with a 
transformation function t*(z)=z-t(z) 
It is obvi~us that the pair T(Z) and T*(Z) are conjugate mappings 
of each other (i.e. T**(Z)=T(Z)) in view of the symmetry 
(1.1) t*(z) + t(z) = z 
Thus If is partitioned into distinct conjugating pairs T(Z) and T*(Z) 
with a self-conjugating member t(z)=t*(z)=.Sz. 
As a diagramatic aid, the transformation function t(z) is represented 
by a transformation curve in diagram 1. A point ZfR, represented on the 
horizontal axis, is transformed ~to X=T(Z)=(X ,x2 , •••Xn) on the vertical1• ·. I 
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the curve in the lower deck and reflects the vertical gaps(i.e. aibi) 
0
between t(z) and the 45 line OR in the upper deck. 
Let us denote the mean value of any WfR by W. 
Definition: For any ZtR, the average ratio of X=T(Z) is ~ X
=X/Z 




of the radial line OA passing through 
the mean point m=(X,Z). Thus when a mapping T(Z),x is given, we have 
a triplet of patterns X={X1,x2 
, •••Xn)=T(Z) and X*=(Xt,X~, •••X~)=T*(Z) 
for any ZfR defining a pair of average ratios ('x' 'x*): 
(1.2) a) f =X/Z=T(Z)/Z and f =X*/Z=T*(Z)/Z satisfying
X x* 
b) because 
c) Z=X+X~ by (1.1) 
For any real valued function t(z)E- "f , a quadruplet of functions 
Q{t(z))={{t(z) ,t*(z)), (T(Z) ,T*{Z))) is defined. In economic applications, 
a triplet of variables (z,x,x*) can form a deterministic "two-equation 
model" M=[z=x+x*,x=t(z)] where z=x+x* is an "accounting equation" and 
x=t(z) is a ''behavior equation" when z is treated as an exogenous 
variable. The behavior equation x=t(z) automatically induces the qua­
druplets Q(t(z)). All the basic concepts of the section can be 
summarized in the following definition. 
Definition: . The behavior equation t(z) of a two-equation model 
M=[z=x+x*,x=t(z)J induces the quadruplets: 
(1.3)a) Q(t(z))=((t(z),t*(Z)), (T(Z),T-k(Z)) 
where t*(z)(T*(Z)) is the conjugate function(mapping) of 
t(z) (T(Z)). Any Z=(z 1,z2~-~-Zn)tR induces a pair of 




for which a triplet of mean values (Z,X,X*) determine 
two average ratios 
c) and 
satisfying (1.2b,c). If I(•) is any reasonable index of 
inequality, a triplet of Eattern inequalities 
d) I(Z), I(X), I(X*) 
can be defined when Z ;:_ 0, X ;:_ 0, and X* > 0 
As an illustration, let the triplet of economic variables be income 
before tax(z), after tax (x*) and tax payment (x) of a typical family 
that satisfies the accounting equaiton z=x+x* in the two-equation model 
M-=[z-x+x*, t (z)J." where the behavior equation t (z) is the· income tax 
· schedule. When a FID pattern Z is given exogeneously, X and X* in 1.3b 
are. respectively, the tax burden pattern and the disposable income 
pattern of n families. The triplet (Z.X,X*) stand for average national 
income, tax payment and disposable income "per family" and hence ~x (~x*) 
in (1.3c) stand for the average tax rate (average disposable income rate) 
I(Z)~I(X) and I(X*) in (1.3d) stand for the 
degree of inequality of Z, X and X* respectively. This model of income 
tax system will be studied in section 3 below where the progressiveness 
of the tax schedule t(z) will be defined (See introduction). 
As another example, let the triplet of economic variables be income 
(z), consumption (c) and saving (s) of families that satisfy the accounting 
equation z=s+c in the two-equation model: 
(1.4) 
where the behavior equation s(z) is the "family saving function" 
and c•s*(z)•z-s(z) is the family consumption function. When an FID 
-8-
pattern Z~R is given exogeneously, the triplet (Z,S,O-S*) stand for 
per capita income {Z), saving{S) and consumption{C), and hence ♦ s-s/z 
(♦
C
sC/Z) is the a;erage propensity to save {consume) of Keynes .. The. 
triplet of I{Z), I{C) and l{S) stand for the inequality of income, 
' This model M will be used inconsumption and saving respectively .. s 
the analysis of saving inequality in section 4 (see introduction). 
In this paper, any index of inequality I(•) belonging to the Balton 
Family9) will be referred to as a reasonable index, Using L{U) ~L(V) 
to mean "U Lorenze Dominates V", it is well known:lO) 
(1.5) I {U) <i I {V) for any reasonable I ( •) if L(U) ~ L(V) 
• 
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Section 2 Reasonable Properties·for T(Z) 
In this section a number of reasonable properties for T(Z) or t(z) 
will be introduced by interpreting t(z) as the income tax schedule. 
Ve may wish to restrict the domain of mapping to n-{ ZIZ .::_ 0}( R. the 




-{ZIZ1<z2••• <Zn}cR the rank preserving 
subset of R. For any FID pattern z. we can always reorder the family 
so that Zfn°. The intersection of n and n° will be denoted by 
A O O . . . 0 
n=n /\ nc n c. R which is the nonnegative rank preserving subset of n • 
Referring to diagram l, the income tax schedule s~ould be nonnegative 
and.lie below the 450_line OR. This motivates the following definition: 
Defin.ition: The mapping T(Z) defined on n as domain is 
At)· ·uon~negative: if X=T(Z)fn for all z~n 
· A2) non-exhaustive: if Xi= T*(Z)( n for all ZE-n 
AJ) · · regular: if it is non-negative and non-exhaustive 
The regularity of T(Z) ensures that the triplet of inequalities in 
(1.3d) (I(Z),I(X),I(X*)) can all be defined unambigiously. 
In diagram 1 the slope of the income tax schedule t(z) is the 
marginal tax rate dt/dz which ordinarily satisfies the following in­
equalities O<dt/dz2.l, to ensure that t(z) and t*(z) are increasing 
functions of z. This motivates the following definitions: 
Definition: The mapping T(Z) defined on n° as domain is 
Bl) non-decreasing: if X=T(Z)fnO for all z~nO 
B2) (marginally) inexcessive: if X~T*(Z)~n
0 for all Zf-n° 
BJ) rank preserving: if it is non-decreasing and inexcessive 
Notice that when T(Z) is rank preserving, the ranks of the families 
in Z is preserved in both X and X* (i.e. they are perfectly rank correlated). 
Notice that the above properties (Al,A2,Bl,B2) are defined in terms 
of a transformation function T(Z) "generated" by a real valued function 
t(z). These properties can be.defined, in terms of t(z), equivalently 
as stated in the following lemma: 
Lemma 1: In terms of dz), the properties Al,A2,Bl,B2 can be defined 
equivalently as follows: 
(2.1) a) Al) ·non-negative t(z) > 0 for all z > 0 
b) A2)· ·non-exhaustive t(z) ~ z for all z > 0 
c) Bl) ·non.:.decreasing t(za) ~ t(zb) for all za-< zb 
d) B2)· ·inexcessive t(z )-t"{~)<z -~ for all z~zba -a 
Proof: To show (2.ld) is equivalent to B2, suppose B2 is valid.
. .
Let z~zb. Construct U=(za,zb,·•·•2b)fn.
0 
Thus T*(U)={t*(za),t*(zb), ••
0 . .t*(zb))tn by B2 and t*(za)=za-t(za)~t*{~)=zb-t(zb). This implies 
t(zb)-t(z )<zb-za - a which proves (2.ld). Conversely suppose (2.ld) is 
valid, z~n.0 Let i<j then_ Z1<Zj. t{Zj)-t(Zi)~Zj-Zi by (2.ld). Then
.Xt=t*{Zi)=Z1-t{Z1)~Zj-t{Zj)=t*(Zj)=Xj which proves X*Hl0• Thus (2. ld) 
and B2 are equivalent. The proofs of the other equivalences are 
similar. Q.E.D. 
From diagram 1 we see that the average tax rates indicated by 






form an increasing (decreasing) sequence 
if the income tax system is "progressive" {regressive). This motivates 
the following definition in which 0/0 is defined to be zero: 
Definition: A mapping T{Z) defined on n as domain is 
Cl) average increasing: if O<z8<zb implies t(za)/za < t{7,)/zb 
C2)_ average decreasing: if O<za<zb implies t(za)/za > t(21,)/zb 
We readily have the following theorem: 
Theorem 1: The pairs (Al,A2),(Bl,B2).(Cl,C2) are anti-symmetricalll) 
pairs of properites for the conjugating pairs of>-(, hence 
a) T(Z) is regular if and only if T*(Z) is regular 
b) T(Z) is rank preserving if and only if T*(Z) is rank 
preserving 
c) ·T(Z) is average increasing (decreasing) if and only if 
· •Tfl(Z) · is average decreasing (increasing). 
The proofs are elementary and are omitted. For example the anti­
symmetry of (Cl,C2) follows readily from 
(2.2) t*(z)/z + ~{z)/z - 1 by (1.1) 
Notice that Al (A2) states that T(Z) (T*(Z)) is endomorphic in A 





is a subset of n and n, the above definitions are applicable when 
A 
the domain of T(Z) is restricted ton. We have the following lemmas: 
A 
Lemma 2: a) T(Z) is endomorphic on n if Al and Bl are satisfied~ 
,. 
b)· ·T•{z)•is endomorphic on n if A2 and B2 are·satisfied 
(Proof: omitted) 
. Lemma 3: a) T(Z) defined on n as domain satisfies Bl if it satisfies 
Al and Cl. 
b) T(Z) defined on n as domain satisfies B2'if it Satisfies 
A2 and C2. 
(Proof: To prove (a), if O<z <zb then t(z )/z < t(z. )/zb by (Cl).- a a a o 
And hence t(zb)>t{z )•zb/z >t(z )>O by Al and zb/z >l. a a a - a 
This proves (a). To prove {b) we see T*(Z) satisfy (Al) and 
(Cl) and hence (Bl) by (a). Hence T(Z) satisfies (B2). Q.E.D.) 
Notice that all the properties which we have introduced are the 
most "ordinary" and hence the most "useful" in the analysis of 
inequalities. 
Section 3 Analysis of·Income·Tax·system 
For the income tax problem of section 1, we begin by interpreting 
(2.1 abed) as four "axioms" for an income tax schedule ·t-{z). Thus 
Al rul,es out subsidy {negative tax). A2 is an "ability to pay" axiom. 
Bl illlplies higher income families pay no less taxes. B2 is an "axiom 
"\ . "\ . 
of incentive preservation" which implies that the disposable income 
wi11 nQt decrease when income before tax increases. Without it, 
\. ·. 
faudlies will obviously not have the incentive to earn a higher income. 
It is easy to show· {A_l,A2,Bl.B2) forms an "axiomatic system" {i.e. they 
are consi"stent and· ind·ependent). 
A popu1ar equity oriental property of a tax schedule is its 
"\ 
"progressiveness" accord·ing to the following definition:_ 
Definition: A tax schedule t{z) is·progressive if T{Z) is·average 
· · iilcre;asing {Cl) 
For a progressive tax schedule, the .average tax rate increases 
,. 
when family income increases. Given t"{z) and an FID pattern ZH2, a 
tax burden pattern X=T{Z) and a disposable income pattern X:k:T*(Z) 
are induced (see 1.3b). We have the following theorem: 
a)··nort~rtegative (Al). and progressive (Cl) if and only if 
b) · ·nort~exhaustive (A2) ~ ;inexcessive {B2) ·and· progressive(Cl) 
· ·1f·and"6nly if L(Z) ~ L(T*(Z)) 
· · f ot ·au· non~urtiform z. ~- n 
(Proof: see below) 
• 
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Notice that lemma 3a implies Bl is satisfied for the tax schedule 
t(z) in theorem 2a and hence L(T(Z)) can be unambiguously defined 
,.. 
because T(Z)E-Jl. by lemma 2a. Theorem I implies that the disposable 
income schedule t*(z) for t(z) in theorem 2b is average decreasing (C2) 
and lemma 2b implies L(T*(Z)) can defined unambiguously. The non­
uniformity of Z (i.e. Z has at least two distinct components) is 
essential for otherwise the theorem is false (i.e. L(Z)=L(T(Z))=L(T*(Z)). 
Theorem 2 will be proved later. 
Since a reasonable tax schedule t(z) should satisfy all "axioms" 
in 2.1, we can define a progressive income tax "system" as follows: 
Definition: An income tax·system is progressive if the tax schedule 
t·(z) is progressive (Cl), non-negative (Al), non-exhaustive 
(A2) and inexcessive {B2). 
Notice that a progressive tax system also satisfies Bl (by lemma 
3a). We have 
Corollary I For a·progressive income tax·system 
a) · ·:t·(z) ·and· t* (z) are regular· and rank· preserving 
b) · ·f*.(z) ·is· average decreasing· (C2) while· t"(z.) · is 
· ·average·increasing (Cl) 
(Proof: implied by theorem I) 
The following characterization of a progressive income tax system 
is·a direct corollary of theorem 2. 
Corollary 2 ·A continuous tax schedule constitutes a progressive 
· ·1ncome·tax system if and only if for a11·non~uniform Zfn, 
. .L(T{Z)) .f L(Z) ~ L(T*(Z)) 
• 
Thus when a legislature intends to design an "equity oriented" 
income tax system (in the sense of L(Z) ~ L(T*(Z)) for every ZH2 ) , 
the tax system must be a progressive one. Corollary 2 implies the 
fol~owing corollary by (1.5): 
Corollary 3 ·For a progressive income tax system, 
I(T*(Z)) < I(Z) < I(T(Z)) 
·for any reasonable index of inequality·!(•). 
Thus we see, for any progressive income tax system, I(Z) is 
always straddled by I(T*(Z)) and I(T(Z)) as the degree of inequality 
of the disposable income pattern I(T*(Z)) (tax burden pattern I(T(Z))) 
is always lower (higher) than I(Z). 
We need the following lellDila to prove theorem 2: 
(3.1) a) X, X'H2 
b) 
c) tQere exists an integer k, l<k<n such that 
.x~~ for a11· i<k and 
X >X 1 for all i>ki 1 
then 
(3.2) L{X1 ) ::_ L(X) 
(Proof: See appendix) 
The proof of the necessary condition of theorem 2a will be outlined 
with the aid of diagram 1. When a non-uniform Zfn is given, let X=T(Z). 
For the average ratio~ =X/Z, we assert:X . 
• 
(3.3) • > 0 
X 
(Proof: Z > 0 because Z is non-uniform, X > 0 because T(Z) is 
non-negative. If X=O then x
1
=0 for i•l,2, •••n 
This contradicts the non-uniformity of Z when t(z) is 
average increasing. Q.E.D.) 
Let a pattern xr:::(Xr ,x', .•••X') be constructed in (3.4a) with
i 2 n 
properties shown in (3.4bc): 
(3.4) a) xr=• Z 
X 
b) Xj+Xi+- ••+X~=X1+X2+- ••+xn 
c) L(X' )=L{Z) 
(Proof: {b) follows from and 
(c) follows from (a) Q.E.D.) 
In diagram one the points (X1,zi) i=l,2,.~.n fall on the radial 
line OA with an equation 
(3.5) x=• z
X 
OA has a strictly positive slope and passes through the mean point 
m=(x,Y). By (3.4c), it is sufficient to prove: 
(3.6) L(X') ~ L(X) 
with the aid of lemma 4. Notice that (3.la) is satisfied by (3.4a) 
(3.lb) ·is satisfied by (3.4b). Thus it is sufficient to prove (3.lc). 
A diagrammatical argument is OA intersects t(z) from above when t(z) is 
average increasing. The details will be supplied in the appendix where 
all other parts of theorem 2 will also be proved. 
. -17-
Section 4 Cause and Consequence of FID Inequality 
The inequality of property income or capital ownershi~ is a major 
cause of FID inequality while the inequality of saving is the con­
sequence {see introduction). In this section, two separate models 
with the form defined in {1.3) will be used to analyze these causual 
relations. 
The first model is M •Iz-s+c>s{z)] defined in (1.4). It should s 
not be a surprise that the mathematical properties {Al,A2,Cl and B2) 
which we have postulated for a progressive income tax EQ'Stem are 
entirely appropriate for the ..saving function s{z)". In particular, 
B2 implies that the consumption function s*{z) is an increasing function 
of family income (z-) and Cl implies "increasing average propensity to 
save" reminicent of the·well known "Keynesian" property at the "family" 
level. All theorems in the last section are applicable. Thus 
corollary 3 can be rephrased as: 
·corollary 3* ·For·a saving function satisfying·(Al,A2,B2) and increasing 
··avetage·ptopensity save (Cl) then 
· ·for·any reasonable index of inequality I(•) and for .. 
· · any·non-uniform income pattern·z,n 
Thus we see, while "increasing average propensity to save" has 
unemployment implications in the multiplier analysis of macro-economics, 
it leads to an equalization of current consumption welfare (l(Z})<l(C)) 
and unequal distribution of capital ownership in future due to "high" 
saving inequality (I(S)>I(Z)). 
For the second model, let the family income {z) be the sum of 
wage {w) and property income {;r) {i.e. in 4.la below) for which an 
empirical property income function is postulated {i.e. t·{z) in 4.lb): 
(4.1) a) z.=w+ ,r 
b) 
These equations form a "two-equation model" lli.e .. Mf=.(z=w+rr, n=t{z)] 
All concepts in (l .3a-d) are now applicable. The "behavior" equation 
,r==t{z) has been used in empirical approaches to FID inequality via the 
so called "factor component approach" .. 
12) It was found that properties 
· (Al,A2,B2,Cl) are, again, satisfied. For example, Al {A2) implies that 
property {wage) incomes are non-negative. Moreover, for families with 
higher total family income, B2 implies that family wage income is higher 
and Cl implies that property income share {i.e. property income as a 
Thus we can again rephrasefraction of total family income) is higher.· 
corollary 3: -
Corollary 3** For a property income function ,r=t(z) satisfying 
{Al,A2,Bl,Cl), then 
I{X)=I{JI1,Il2, ••••nn) > I(Z) > I(X*)=I(WPW2, •••Wn) 
for any reasonable index of inequality and for any 
non-uniform ZfSt 
This conclusion, stating that, using an arbitrary index of inequality, 
property income (wage income) tends to be more (less) unequally dis­
tributed than Z, is a generalization of a known results when the Gini 
coefficient was used(see footnote 12). 
When the Gini coefficient is used, a well known theorem in the 
13)
"factor component approach"~: 
(4.2) If z, X, X~ and:-Z=X+X* then G(Z)• ♦ G(X)+ ♦ G(X*) where 
X x* 
a} +•X/Z (the property income share)
X 
b) ♦ •X*/Z {the wage income share)x* 
Since G(Z) is the weighted averaged of the factor Ginis, (4.2) 
implies two alternatives: 
(4.3)a) G(X*) < G(Z) < G(X) or' 
b) G(X*) > G(Z) > G(X) 
Notice that corollary 3** rules out the second alternative and 
implies the following theorem: 
Theorem 3 For a property income function n~t(z) satisfying (Al,A2,Bl,Cl) 
(4.4)a) G(Z)= ♦ G(X)+t ~G(X*) (for ♦, ♦ *defined in (4.2abc))
X X" X X 
b) G(X*) < G(Z) < G(X) 
for all non-uniform Zfn 
(Proof: Since T*(~) and T(Z) are non-negative and rank 
... 
preserving by corollary la, we have Z,X,X* ~ n. That 
Z=X+X* follows from (1.3b). Thus (4.2) and corollary 3** 
complete the proof. Q.E.D.) 
This theorem, in terms of Cini coefficient, can be used to 
- 14)
strengthen the results in the pre~ious section. 
In this section, w~ ~erive two major conclusions. On the one hand, 
corollary 3** states that the inequality of "property income" is a major 
cause of FID inequality -- in the sense of the "factor component approach". 
rootInferentially, the inequality of family "ownership of capital" is a 
cause of FID inequality. On the other hand, corollary 3* implies that 
family saving is more unequally distributed than income, That this will 
in turn leads to "unequal capital accumulation" in the future, is the 
central theme of the next section• 
• 
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Section 5 Growth With Wealth Concentration 
In a capitalistic society, families accumulate capital assets through 
savings. A family saving pattern S•{S ,s2, ••• Sn) leads directly to1 
the increase of privately held capital stocks K-={K ,K2, •••Kn). 
Let
1 
K's(Ki,K2,...K~) be the family ownership pattern of capital in the 
. next period, then 
(5.l)a) K'-=K+S 
b) K' ~ 0, K ~ 0, S > 0 
Let the sum of all elements in K',K.and S be denoted by B',B and J 
respectively. We have the following macro magnitudes: 
(5. 2)a) H'-=H+J 
b) 1\t=J/H={H'/H)-1 
In {5.2b), nk is the capital growth rate for the whole economy. 
"' 
Let us assume ~n. {i.e. let the families be ranked according to the 
amount of capital assets they own "this" period). Then {5.la) shows 
(5.3)a) SHl and KEO implies 
"' 
b) K'Hl 
Notice that condition {5.3a) means "families that own more capital 
save more" and condition {5.3b) implies the family ranks of Kare 
preserved in K' • 
In case the Gini coefficient is used, (4.2) of the last section 
leads directly to our next theorem. In the statement of theorem 4, n 
~ 
•in (5.4b) is the rate of change of G{K), the Gini coefficient of the 
capital ownership pattern and nk is the capital growth rate defined 
in (5.2b). • 
Theorem 4 For K'=K+S, we have 
(5.4)a) l\;-=u(v-1) where 
b) '\;"" (G(K' )-G(K)) /G(K) 
c) u= 1\/ (1+1\) 
d) v= G(S)/G(K) 
if (5.3a) is satisfied ___ _ 
(Proof: (4.2) implies G(K')=~kG(K)+~sG(S) where 
, ~1-,k and ,k=H/H'=l/(1+1\) by (5.2b). A routine 
6 
calculation leads to (5.4). Q.E.D.) 
Since realistic empirical value of nk is less than 10%, the term 
u has the same order of magnitude as 1\ (e.g. u=.0099, .• 019, ••• , .056 
for- nk= 1%, 2%, ." •• , 6%). Thus (5.4a) becomes: 
(5.5) v=G(S)/G(K) 
approximately. We shall refer to nG as the rate (i.e. the rapidity) 
of "equity orientation". Since capital accumulation lies at the heart 
15) . 
of growth, equation (5.5) shows that the rate of equity of orientation 
(nG) is proportional to the capital growth rate (nk). Hence for a fast 
growing economy, the "equity" of capital ownership changes rapidly. 
We shall refer to a positive (negative) value of nG as an "inequitable" 
("equitable") orientation of capital ownership because the ownership of 
capital stock become more unequally (equally) distributed through time. 
Equation (5.5) shows: 
(5.6)a) nG > 0 if and only if v > 1 or 
b) G(S) > G(K) 
Thus growth with an inequitable orientation occurs when the 
saving pattern Sis more unequally distributed than the pattern of 
capital ownership K. Thus (5.6b) is the necessary and sufficient 
condition for a "conflict thesis" (i.e. growth with wealth con-
centration) provided condition (5.3a) is satisfied (i.e. pro-
vided families that own more capital save more). Hence the 
differentiated family saving habits are the root cause of growth 
with wealth concentration. 
The fact that "families that own more capital save more" 
(i~e. (5.3a)), in itself, does not imply the "conflict thesis". 
A stronger condition on the differentiated saving habits between the 
high and low capital owning families is needed. Heuristically, let 
us postulate a "Classical" savings function (see below) s==s(k) 
relating the amount of family saving (s) to the amount of capital 
stock (k) that the family owns
16>: 
Definition: The capital sensitive saving function s(k) is "Classical" 
if it satisfies (Al) and (Cl). 
Thus a classical s=s(k) implies two conditions being satisfied. 
First of all, saving is non-negative. Secondly, s/k increases with 
k (i.e. increasing capital-sensitive average propensity to save)~ When 
s(k) is postulated we have: 
A A 
Lemma 5 For Kfn we have S=(S ..?!_2, ••• s1
)=(s(K ),s(K2), •••• s(K ))~n1
(5. 7) if s(k) is a "classical" saving function 
(Proof: Lemma 3a implies that s(k) satisfies Bl. Q.E.D.) 
Thus with a classical saving function (5.3ab) are satisfi~d. 
Furthermore we also have the following conclusion needed to complete 
the conflict thesis due to the "strongly -differentiated" saving habits 
implied by the .classical saving function. 
Theorem 5 The classical saving function implies L(S) ~ L(K) for 
every nonuniform Kfn 
(Proof: (5.7) shows that s(k) corresponds to a transformation 
function with property Bl, Al and Cl. The necessary condition 
of theorem 2a completes the proof.) 
Thus l(S) > l(K) for any reasonable index of inequality. In 
particular (5.6b) is satisfied. Lemma 5 and theorem 5 imply the 
followng corollary. 
Corollary 4 Under a classical saving function 
(5.8) where v=G(S)/G(K) > 1 
Thus we see that the classical saving function ensures growth has 
inequitable orientation with a rapi~ity proportional tonk. Thus 
we know G(K') > G(K) in terms of Gini coefficient. The following 
theorem is a more general theorem that asserts I(K') > I(K) for any 
reasonable index of inequality. 
Theorem 6 The "classical saving .function" implies L(K') ~ L(K) 
for every non-uniform K~n. 
17)
Notice theorem 6 implies the following corollary : 
·Corollary 5 The Classical saving rule is a sufficient condition for 
growth with an inequitable orientation in which 
I(K')>l(K) for any reasonable index of inequality. 
(Proof: by (1.5)) 
To prove theorem 6, let us refer to niss /K as the accumulation
1 1 
rate and oi•K /H (o1cK1/H') as the capital wealth share of the i-th1 





Since the national capital growt~ rate nkis the weighted average of 
the family accumulation rates (ni in 5.10a), (5.9b) implies that the 
families can be partiitoned into two classes (i.e. family groups), 
H L 
a high class C and a low class C as follows: 
(5. ll)a) CL= ·{iln1<nk}=(l,2, •••p) 
b) CH= {jjnj>nk}=(p+l, p+2, ••••n) 
Thus-the cumulation rate of any family in CL is strictly lower 
than that of any family in C
H as it is lower than the national growth 
rate (nk). The "comparative" cumulation rate of the i-:-th family, Ei 
is defined in (5.12b) below: 
.f...... - 1... ,-,? ......" where 
We have the following lemma: 
Lemma 6 The "Classical" saving function implies that for CL and 
CH defined in (5.11), ifCL and jfCH imply 
(5.13)a) ni < nj 
b) ai ~ aj 
c) ai ~ ai (j-=p+l, p+2, •••n) 
(Proof: (5.13a) follows from (5.11 ). (5.13b) follows from 
(5.9a). (5.13c) follows from (5.12) and (5.13a), namely 
This theorem implies that the classical saving function has a 
natural class-oriented interpretation such that the property share 
and cumulation rate of every high class family is higher than those of 
low class family. Furthermore, (5.13c) implies that under the 
classical rule there is a concentration of capital wealth in the upper­
class families CH in the growth process. Notice 
(5.14) 
L Hand C and C are not empty (i.e. l~<n) when K is not uniform. 
Condition (5.14) (5.10b) and (5.13c) and lemma 4 imply L(o)>L(o') 
and hence L(K)~L(K'). This proves theorem 6. Thus we see that the 
classical saving rule-implies a "radical" conclusion of wealth concentration 
in the growth process, with a class oriented consequence. 
Conclusion. 
The "radical" conclusion of "growth with capital weal_th concentration" 
was based decisively on the "classical" saving function. However. 
whether or not the~"classical saving rule is valid is an empirical 
question that can be verified statiscally. Suppose s•s(z) in (1.4) 
and n-=t(z) in (4.lb) are estimated statistically. Then for ,isrk we 
have 
-1(6.1) k=k{s.r):t{s (s))/r 
which is a functional relation between k (family held capital 
stock) ands (family saving) taking r (the rate of return to capital) 
as a parameter. It is not "necessarily true" that s/k is an increasing 
function of k. 
When the financial institutions (banks, stock markets etc.) are 
primitive, it may be true that the vast majority of the workers (i.e. 
those who receive only wage income) do not save because they can 
not save without becoming entrepreneurs and manage the capital assets 
directly. For such "under developed countries" it may be legitimate 
to assume: 
(6.2)a) implies Tli -=O 
b) implies 11i-=r (the rate of return to capital) 
One can readily shows that this is a "naive" classical saving 
rule (i.e. workers with no property income do not save (6.2a) and 
capital owner saves all property income (6.2b)) which is perhaps 
what the "class oriented" classical writers of the 19th century had 
1-7)
in mind. In the contemporary world,when it is possible for the 
. . . 
workers to acquire titles to capital assets through the inter-· 
mediation of financial institutions, the classical saving rule should 
not be an asserted one. In the age of econometrics, the statistical 
problem of (6.1) can be investigated with the aid of household survey 
data after all. 
Even when (6.1) is found to be "average increasing" empirically, 
the pattern of capital ownership may not become more unequally dis­
tributed through time for another reason, namely, the number of families 
(n) will increase when population and labor force increase.IS) The 
spliting of the property of a deceased ''head of household" to 
more than one heir (i.e. new family starts) will obviously imply a 
"counter concentration" tendency an,d with a more equal distribution of 
property ownership. Thus growth with or without concentration of 
property ownership has other dimensions, the analysis of which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
Footnotes 
(1) See Kuznets [8], Adelman and Morris [l]. 
(2) ·. See World Bank Publications [2], and Paukert [10]. 
(3) In the sense as defined by KuznP.ts[S]. 
(4) See Schumpeter[ll], pp. 439 
(5) See Fei-Ranis-Kuo [3] and [4]. 
(6) See Fei-Ranis-Kuo{4], chapter 3 
(7) A Keynes saving behavior is "income-sensitive" as postulated in 
the well known saving function. The classical writers in the 
19 century believes that saving is "capital sensitive". See 
discussions in section 5 {See footnote 16). 
(8) See Fields[5] 
.(9) An index of the Dalton Family satisfies the axioms of transitivity, 
symmetry, and rank preserving equalization. It is well known that 
the familiar Gini coefficient, Atkinson index, Theil index and 
coefficient of variation are reasonable indices. See Fields and 
Fei 16). . 
(10) See Fields and Fei [ 6] 
(11) A property pair (P1,P ) is anti-symmetrical when "t(z) satisfies2Pi if and only if t*{z) satisfies the other property". 
(12) Fei-Ranis-Kuo [3] postulated a property income function (4.lb) 
in the lin~ar -fnrm -rr=l.+!>y !>nn -fn11nn t-h!>t" t-hP 11rnTTP1;it-inn 
characteristics" is quite high. They refer to property income as 
"type one income"· as b < 0 and O <a< 1~ The readers should 
check that Al, A2, B2 and Cl are satisfied when the income range 
is properly restricted. Using this result they deduced the in­
equalities of corollary 3** when the Gini coefficient is used. 
(13) See Fei-Ranis-Kuo [4]~ ''monotonic model" p. 365 
(14) For example, the Ginj coefficient of income before tax is a 
a weighted average of the Ginis of disposable income and tax 
burden pattern. 
(15) This is true at least for contemporary less developed countries 
in the early stage of development. For professor Kuznets[9] 
bas pointed out that the epochal characteristic of modern 
growth is technology change embodied in new capital formation. 
(16) The relation between the income sensitive saving function s(z) 
in (1.4) and the capital sensitive saving function s(k) 
postulated here will be discussed in (6.1) below. 
(17) See Schumpeter[ll], pp.641, for a discussion on the sources of 
capital accumulation (e.g. "capital increases by revenue's 
being converted into it") accoring to the "classic" schema of eco-
,.uomic growth. The fact that the working and capital-o'Wlling 
classes have stror,gly differentiated saving habits was formulated 
as a crucial behavior hypothesis in the growth model of 
Kaldor[7]. 
(18) Fei-Ranis-Kuo [4] found that the time series of the Gini co­
efficients of property income are, in fact, falling for all· 
households and for all urban households between 1964 and 1972 
in Taiwan. 
Appendix 
Since lemma 4 is needed in the proof of theorem 2, we will prove lennna 
4 and theorem 2 in sequence. 
(1) Proof of lemma 4: 
and ISi- s1-si. 
For i<k, we have o1>0 by 
for all i>k•X.1.+CXi+l<O 
Since on-o by (3.lb), then ok, ok+1, ••• 15n strictly monotonically 
decreases to zero. Thus ok>O and o1>0 for all i=l,2 •• ,n. Q.E.D. 
(2) Proof of the necessary condition of theorem 2a: 
~ ~ 
Let ZEn. then x~T(Z)in by lemma 2a and 3a. To complete the 
proof given in the text, let X' be constructed as in (3.4a). We 
want to prove (3.6) by proving (3.lc). Let the set of the first n 
integers be partitioned into two subsets: 
A.l)a) (1,2,. ••• n)= r-u r+ 
b) r-•{ijXi<Xi}; r+•{ijXi>Xi} which imply 
- +c) f /\f a:_4> (null set) 
We claim that both r- and r+ are not empty sets•. i.e. 
A.2)a) r-,J 4> 
b) r+.; 4> 
(3.lb) implies r-,J:4>. Supposer+•4>. 
+the fact that Z is nonuniform and t(z) is progressive. Thus r ,f.:4>. 
We claim that 
A.3) iH- and j Er+ imply i < j 
ifr- implies Xi/Zi <Xi/Zi=~x-xj/Zi<Xj/Zi(because j~r+) 
A 
Thus Xi/Zi<Xj/Zj. We have i<j because Zfn and t(z) satisfies 
(Cl). 
Let k be the largest integer of r-. Then r--(1,2, •••k) and 
r+c(k+l,k+2, •••n) l<k<n. -Thus (3.lc) is proved. Q.E.D. 
(3) Proof of the sufficient condition of theorem 2a: 
To prove the sufficient condition of theorem 2a. Suppose 
A 
L(T(Z))~L(Z) for all non-uniform Zfn. Let Za, Zb be any two 
real numbers ·satisfying O<Z <Z... We want to prove- a -b 
A.4)a) t(Z )>O (i.e. to prove t(z) is non-negative) . a-
b) a:t{Za)/Za<t{~)/Zb=8 (i.e. to prove t(z) satisfies Cl) 
The fact that L(T(U)) can be unambiguously defined implies 
T(U}~O. This proves A.4a. To prove A.4b, we know that 
For if t(Za)=t(Zb), then T(U) i~ a uniform 
pattern and L(T(U))>L(U) is impossible. t(z) is 
thus either monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing. 
Case 1: for all Z ,Zb satisfying O<Z <Zb then t(Z )<t(Zb)a - a a 
Let Z , ~ be any two real number satisfying 0<Z <~ 
8 8 
Let the sum of all elements in U(T(U}} be denoted by s=Za+(n-l)Zb>O 
(st zt(Z }+(n-l}t(Z.. )>O). The normalization of U(T(U)) becomes a -b 
Ui.::(z:,zt,····Z~)=(l/s)(Za,~'-··~' (T(U)*={p,q, •••q)=(l/st)(t(Za), 
t(~), .... t(~))) for case one, with z:+(n-l}~L-p+(n-l)q. 
>Lemma 4 can :be, applied. Notice Z~ if and only ifa< 
Thus either L(T(U)*)~L(U*) or L(T(U)*)<L(U*) if Z"!/p.
a 
Since we know L(U*)=L(U)>L(T(U))=L(T(U)*), so Z*=Z /s>p:t(Z )/st.a a a 
If t(Z )•O then t(Z )/Z <t(Zb)/2... Hence Cl is proveda a a -b 
If t(Z )>O, then Z /s>t(Z )/s can be written as a a a t 
Q.E.D. 
Case 2: for all Z ,Zb satisfying O<Z <Zb then t(Z }>t{2..)a -a a -b 
Since t(z) monotonically decreases and bounded from below by 
zero, we know lim t(z)=c ~ O. If t{¾)=O then t(x)=O for all 
z-+..,
x>¾· The Lorenze curve for C¾,x,x, •••x)=O can not be defined. 
Thus t(¾)>O. For a pair of real numbers·O<Z <Zb, construct . a 
the following vector with n components: 
V=(Z ,z , ...z ,Zb)fn with a sum sa(n-l)Z=+2..>0;a a · a _ 7> 
T(V)=(t(Z ),t(Z ), ••• r(Z ),t(¾))>O which can be reordered to 
8 8 8 
Fx(t(Zb),t(Z ), ••••• t(Za))f0 with a sum st•t(¾)+(n-l)t(Z )>0
8 8 
V and F can be normalized to become 
V"==(Z*,Z*, ••• Z*,Zb*)={l/s)(Z ,z , ...z ,Zb)a a a a a a 
F*={p,q, ••••••q)={l/s ){t(Zb),t{Z ), ••• t(Z )) with (n-l)Z*+Z*=p+(n-l)q.t a a 
We have ~ -¾/s=l/(l+(n-l)(Z /Zb))
8 




For all sufficiently large Z Zb, the ratio t(Za)/t(Zb) is 
8 
arbitrarily close to one (by the Cauchy property). Hence p 
and q can be made arbitrarily close to 1/n (i.e. F* can be made 
arbitrarily close to a uniform pattern (1/n,l/n, •• ~l/n)). 
For a fixed Za we can choose~ sufficiently large to make 
Za/¾ arbitrarily close to zero. Thus zt (Z!) is made arbitrarily 
close to 1 (0), and hence V* can be constructed to be arbi­
trarily close to (0,0, ••• 1). Thus we can construct V* and F* 
such that L(F*)~L(V*). However L(V)•L(V*)<L(F*)=L(F)=L(T(V). 
This contradiction implies that case two is impossible. Q.E.D. 
· {4) Proofs of the necessary and sufficient condition of .theorem 2b 
~re sudlar to those of theo~em 2a. 
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